Defensive weapons and star wars: a supergame with optimal punishments

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if the latter are symmetric across countries, while asymmetric endowments of such weapons have clear-cut destabilising consequences.     

灰色矩阵对策

本文结合灰色系统与对策论的知识,给出了以区间型灰数为元素的灰矩阵对策的定义,讨论了灰矩阵对策在纯策略与混合策略意义下的最优策略及灰解的存在性。     

灰色可靠性设计模型及其在机械工程应用

将灰色系统推广到概率统计理论 ,阐述了灰色概率公理化体系 ,研究了灰色概率密度函数与灰色可靠度计算方法 ,建立了应力—强度干涉灰色可靠度计算模型及其白化求解方法 ,编制了matlab5 3语言程序。给出了工程应用实例 ,并对结果与常规可靠性设计进行了对比分析 ,显示了本模型的正确性与可行性。它可用于设计参数变动对可靠度的灵敏度分析及其稳健性可靠性设计 ,有效地控制设计参数     

灰色系统理论在火灾预测中的应用

简述了灰色系统理论的基本概念与方法,并着重阐述了灰色理论中灾变预测的特点和其建模过程,并将其应用于实际火灾预测之中。     

Cost allocation rules for elastic single‐attribute situations

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.     

战术通信网组网方案评估优选方法

在当前信息化的战场环境下,战场环境瞬息万变,战术通信网作为信息化战争的神经中枢,起到了至关重要的作用,然而组网方案的好坏直接决定着通信网性能的优劣,因此,如何在战场环境下快速、自动、客观地评估战术通信网组网方案是一个亟待解决的问题。通过分析战术通信网的特性和要求,提出了战术通信网组网方案评估指标体系,并采用熵权灰关联的方法对组网方案进行评估优选,该方法方便快捷并且可以编程实现,不仅能够在战场环境下实时、自动地对组网方案进行评估优选,而且评估结果也符合实际情况,为指挥员提供了决策依据。     

从大国博弈视角解读与应对第三次抵消战略

在常规军力优势相对衰落、经费预算日益缩紧的背景下,美军为维持其军事霸权,提出了旨在实现兵力全球自由投送的第三次抵消战略(Third Offset Strategy)。通过梳理抵消战略的现实背景、历史沿革和战略目的,我们发现如果把第三次抵消战略简单视作美军的军事技术发展战略甚至军事战略,就会陷入片面而幼稚的认识误区。除了防范潜在的技术诱骗和技术突袭,更应该从大国博弈的战略视角出发,全面审视和应对第三次抵消战略对我国的挑战。美军实现国家利益的需求导向、自我变革的决心勇气和创新能力、科技兴军的先进理念和以军为主的军民融合成功经验值得借鉴。要以我为主参与制定未来战争的"游戏规则",做到"你打你的,我打我的";要深入研究美军作战体系和美国国家战略的薄弱环节,有针对性地"攻其所必救",从而化解重大安全挑战,争得新的战略机遇期。     

Nothing fails like success: The London Ambassadors’ Conference and the coming of the First World War

During the July Crisis Britain’s foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, focused on organising a conference through which differences could be reconciled. After the war, he maintained that Germany’s unwillingness to join this conference was one of the immediate causes of war. This essay disputes Grey’s contention, arguing that his plans for a conference, based on a misleading analogy to the previous Balkan Crises, actually helped facilitate the outbreak of war in 1914 by sanctioning inaction in the first phase of the crisis (28 June–22 July) and by tacitly encouraging Russian mobilisation in the second phase (23 July–4 August).     

大班幼儿建构游戏中同伴互动行为分析

采用非参与式观察法对36名大班幼儿建构游戏中的同伴互动行为进行观察,将收集到的344起同伴互动事件进行分析,从互动性别、互动主题、互动方式和互动情绪四个方面探讨大班幼儿在建构游戏中同伴互动行为的特征。并提出如下建议:教师应摒弃性别角色的刻板印象,鼓励女孩大胆体验建构游戏;教师应承认两性差异,给予男孩更多的耐心;幼儿园应定期评估材料的充分性与适宜性,投放充足且丰富的建构材料;教师应鼓励幼儿多进行分享、赞扬的友好互动。